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Rodenberg: Rodenberg: Indirect Preferences

INDIRECT PREFERENCES:
RECOVERY UNDER
SECTIONS 547 AND 550

OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Levit v. Ingersoll Rand FinancialCorporation'

I. INTRODUCTION
Can a lender who does not demand a personal guarantee on a
corporate loan be in a better position than one who does? Financial
institutions routinely obtain a personal guarantee from an officer of the
debtor corporation. If the corporation defaults on the loan, the lender
can pursue the officer-guarantor to cover the debt. Lenders may reevaluate this daily practice in light
of the May 15, 1989 decision in Levit
2
v. Ingersoll Rand FinancialCorp.
The issue in Levit was whether to extend the preference-recovery
period for outside creditors from ninety days to one year when an inside
guarantor is benefitted. Although the majority of federal district and
bankruptcy courts had held that such an outside creditor was subject to
the ninety day preference-recovery period of section 547(b)(4)(A) of Title
28,' Levit presented a question of first impression for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Judge Easterbrook held that
under the United States Bankruptcy Code (Code) a bankruptcy trustee
may recover a debtor corporation's payment to an "outside creditor"4
made within one year before the petition for bankruptcy if the payment
benefitted an "inside guarantor"5 of the debtor.6 The decision might

1. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
2. Id
3. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988).
4. An "outside creditor" is any creditor to whom a debtor owes a debt. The
distinction is made because the Bankruptcy Code refers to "insiders" who have
a basis for control over the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988); see also i&
§ 101(30).
5. For a discussion of "inside guarantor," see infra notes 41-62 and
accompanying text.
6. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1200-01.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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impact the lender practice of acquiring an inside guarantee on corporate

loans.
The Levit case addressed three different debtdr pre-bankruptcy
payment situations that the bankruptcy trustee sought to include in the
one year preference period of section 547(b)(4)(B): (1) delinquent federal
withholding tax payments,7 (2) payments on employee welfare and
pension plan notes that benefitted an inside guarantor,' and (3)
payments to outside creditors that benefitted inside guarantors. This
Note will focus on the third situation.

II. THE FACTS
The City of Chicago awarded V.N. Deprizio Construction Company
a contract to extend a subway system to O'Hare Airport. 9 Because of
financial difficulties during the project, Deprizio Co. borrowed money
from Ingersoll Rand Financial Corporation.'
Richard Deprizio, the
11
firm's president, and his brothers personally guaranteed the loan.
During the year preceding the petition, Deprizio Company made

7. Id at 1191-92. Deprizio Company had made substantial payments on
delinquent federal withholding taxes in the year before bankruptcy. Id. at 1188.
Regarding these payments, the court held that "insiders who may be liable on
account of the firm's failure to pay taxes are not 'creditors' because they do not
hold 'claims' against their firns." Id. at 1200. Accordingly, delinquent taxes
paid more than ninety days before the filing may not be recovered under section
550(a). Id8. Id- at 1192-94. When Deprizio Company fell behind in making required
payments to pension and welfare funds, it executed notes in favor of the plans
and Richard Deprizio co-signed the notes. Id. at 1188. Regarding payments to
these plans in the year prior to bankruptcy, the court held:
pension and welfare trusts may recover from insiders only to the
extent state law allows that under rules for disregarding the corporate
form, or the insiders make contractual commitments enforceable
under section 515 of ERISA. When state law supports "veil piercing"
it does so on the ground that the investor and the firm are a single
entity, which precludes the insider from holding a "claim" against the
firm. The Trustee therefore may not recover payments to pension and
welfare trusts made more than 90 days before the filing, unless those
trusts negotiated for and received contractual guarantees from
insiders-in which event the funds should be treated just like any
other outside creditor.
Id. at 1200.
9. Id at 1187.
10. Id, Deprizio Company had also borrowed from the City of Chicago, CIT
Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. (CIT), and Melrose Park Bank & Trust. Id.
11. Id. Richard Deprizio co-signed the note to Melrose Park Bank & Trust.
In addition, he and his brothers guaranteed the debts to the other lenders. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/22
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payments on the Ingersoll Rand loan. 12 The company filed a Chapter
11 petition under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 before finishing the

project. 13
The bankruptcy court appointed Louis W. Levit the trustee in
bankruptcy for the estate of V.N. Deprizio Construction Company. 4
Levit filed an adversary proceeding against the lender. He sought to
recover the payments to it made more than 90 days but within the year
before the petition in bankruptcy. 5 Levit argued that the payments
made to the outside creditor benefitted inside co-signers and guarantors.' 6
Therefore, the payments were avoidable preferences under
sections 54717 and 55018 of the Code. 19

12. Id.
13. In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co., 86 Bankr. 545, 549 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1988), affd in part, rev'd in part sub noma. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp.,
874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). The case was later converted to a dissolution
proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Code. Id
14. In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co., 58 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
15. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1188.
16. Id The outsider creditors were Ingersoll Rand Financial Corporation,
the pension and welfare funds, and the Internal Revenue Service. Id at 118788.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). Section 547(b) reads:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the
17. filing of the petition, if such creditor, at the time of such
transfer(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent
at the time of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1983). This is the 1983 version of the statute. In 1984,
Congress amended the voidable preference section to eliminate the requirement
set forth in subsection (b)(4)(B)(ii) that an insider have "reasonable cause to

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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The bankruptcy judge, Robert L. Eisen, denied the trustee's request
and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. 20 Judge Eisen held that the trustee could not
avoid the payments to the outside creditor made more than ninety days
but within the year before the petition in bankruptcy. 2' He maintained it would be inequitable to require surrender of funds from a good

believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer." See 11 U.S.C. §
547 (b)(4)(B)(ii) (1988). The original action was filed in 1983, before the
effective date of the amendment. Therefore, the 1983 version controls.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 950(a)-(c) (1988). Section 550 provides in part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent
that a transfer is avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or
724(a) of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the
estate, the property transferred, or if the court so orders, the value of
such property, from(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity
for whose benefit such transfer was made; or.
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial
transferee.
(b) The trustee may not recover under" section (a)(2) of this
section from(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt, in good
faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the
transfer avoided; or
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of
such transferee.
(c) The trustee is entitled to only a single satisfaction under
subsection (a) of this section.

Id&

19. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1188. See infra notes 41-62 and accompanying text
for discussion of avoidable insider preferences.
20. In re Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 550.
21. In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co., 58 Bankr. 478, 480 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986), rev'd, 86 Bankr. 545 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). Judge Eisen adopted the
two-transfer theory of In re Mercon Industries, Inc., 37 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1984). In re Deprizio, 58 Bankr. at 480. The theory maintains that when
an inside guarantor is present, any payment to an outside creditor is actually
two transfers-one to the outside creditor and one to the inside guarantor. The
preferehce recovery period for the two are different. I&, See infra notes 70-74
and accompanying text. The judge concluded that the trustee could not prove
that the outside creditor was an insider and had reasonable cause to believe that
the debtor was insolvent at the time, as required by section 547(b). In re
Deprizio, 58 Bankr. at 480. Therefore, the trustee could only recover from the
inside guarantor. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/22
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faith outside creditor who did not act in concert with the inside
guarantors. 22
Levit filed an interlocutory appeal.'
On appeal, Judge Paul E.
Plunkett, United States District Court for the Eastern Division of the
Northern District of Illinois reversed and remanded.' Judge Plunkett
instructed the bankruptcy court to determine (1) whether the payments
identified by the trustee occurred, (2) whether an insider received a
benefit from any particular payment, and (3) whether section 547(c)
protected any of them.' Judge Plunkett held that all payments made
to the outside creditor between ninety days and one year before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition were recoverable from the creditor
when such creditor had a legally enforceable right to recover from the
inside guarantors.'
In a27separate appeal, the district court followed
Judge Plunkett's opinion.
Judge Plunkett certified the question under section 1292(b) of Title
28, and the Seventh Circuit granted leave to appeal. 28 Judge Easterbrook held that "the preference-recovery period for outside creditors is
one year when the payment
produces benefit for an inside creditor,
'2
including a guarantor."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The court certified the issue on appeal as "whether the Trustee may
recover from an outside creditor under § 550(a)(1) a transfer more than
90 days before the filing that is avoided under § 547(b) because of a
benefit for an inside creditor.'" ° The question falls within the area of

22. In re Deprzio, 58 Bankr. at 481.
23. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1188.
24. In re Deprio, 86 Bankr. at 556. Judge Plunkett held that "payments
that the debtor made to its outside creditors on obligations guaranteed by
insiders were subject to expanded preference period in determining whether
transfers constituted avoidable preferences." Judge Plunkett also held "all
payments from one year to ninety days before the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy made to creditors who, by operation of their guarantee or by
operation of law, had a legally enforceable right to recover from Debtor's insiders
are subject to preference rules of the Bankruptcy Code and are recoverable from
non-insider recipients of the payments." Id. at 553.
25. Id. at 556.
26. Id. at 553.
27. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1188 n.1. "One creditor's appeal from the bankruptcy
court was assigned to Judge Leinenweber, who held the case in abeyance
pending Judge Plunkett's opinion and followed his decision in a brief order." Id
28. Id. at 1188.
29. Id. at 1192.
30. Id at 1194.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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bankruptcy law commonly referred to as the "law of preferences. 3 1
Since the passage of the Code, courts have differed as to the preferencerecovery period for transfers to outside creditors that benefit an inside
guarantor. Should the presence of an inside guarantor in a transfer
extend the preference-recovery period for an outside creditor from ninety
days to one year?
A. Bankruptcy Preferences Provisions
The preference provisions of the Code 32 operate to prevent
creditors with knowledge of a pending bankruptcy from receiving any
of the debtor's assets to the detriment of creditors who have no
knowledge of the pending bankruptcy. 3' The purpose of the preference
provisions "is to proscribe those transactions that represent attempts,
conscious or unconscious, to rearrange the distribution scheme that falls
into place upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition."' The bankruptcy
trustee can recover payments from any creditor that are determined to
be preferential and are made within a specified time prior to the
bankruptcy petition.
One commentator has noted that "[tihe bankruptcy preference laws
have been hailed as 'the single greatest contribution of the Bankruptcy
Act to the field of commercial law."'
When a bankrupt debtor does
not have enough assets to pay all creditors in full, the question becomes
one of who will get how much of the available assets. "Bankruptcy,

31. For a complete discussion of the preference laws, see Pitts, Insider
Guarantiesand the Law of Preferences, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343 (1981).
32. The sections relevant to this discussion are 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 550 (1983).
Preferences are defined as "transfers that favor one existing creditor over
another." Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 728
(1984). Jackson discusses the role of the preference provisions within the
bankruptcy process.
33. Judge Easterbrook described the policy underlying this concept as:
The trustee's power to avoid preferences (the "avoiding power") is
essential to make the bankruptcy case a collective proceeding for the
determination and payment of debts. Any individual creditor has a
strong incentive to make off with the assets of a troubled firm, saving
itself at potential damage to the value of the enterprise. Many a firm
is worth more together than in pieces, and a spate of asset-grabbing
by creditors could dissipate whatever firm-specific value the assets
have .... All creditors gain from a rule of law that induces each to
hold back.
Levit, 874 F.2d at 1194.
34. Nutovic, The Bankruptcy Preference Laws: InterpretingCode Sections
547(c)(2), 550(a)(1), and 546(a)(1), 41 Bus. LAw. 175, 186 (1985).
35. Id. at 175.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/22
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then, exists to constrain creditors (and others) from attempting to
promote their individual interests when doing.so would be detrimental
to the group of claimants."'"
Specifically, the preference laws prevent creditors from changing
their existing position among all other creditors in anticipation of a
bankruptcy proceeding.37 These laws focus on "relationships among
creditors in light of the advantages of a collective proceeding, not on
relationships between creditors and their debtor."' Thus, "[p]reference
law is concerned ... with creditor's postloan attempts to collect from a
languishing debtor, and thereby to escape from the class of unsecured
creditors into a class of paid (or secured) creditors, made with an eye to
opt out of the incipient collective proceeding."39 The preference laws
in effect undo what otherwise would often be a legitimate transa6tion
if not for the debtor's insolvency. Therefore, the "courts struggle40to do
equity within the confines of an unambiguously worded statute.,
B.

The Relationship Between Sections 54 7 and 550

Operation of the preference provisions involves two separate
actions: (1) avoidance and (2) recovery. Section 547 governs avoidability
while section 550 determines recoverability. 41 Section 547 of the Code
defines the circumstances under which a trustee can avoid a preferential
transfer to a creditor.42 Section 550 of the Code defines from whom the
avoided transfer may be recovered.4" In other words, the trustee looks
to section 547 to decide if a transfer may be avoided and then looks to
section 550 to see from whom the transfer may be recovered.
Section 547 enables a trustee to avoid any transfer that is either (1)
to a creditor or (2) for the benefit of a creditor. 44 Therefore, the first
question to be resolved is whether an inside guarantor is a creditor for
section 547 purposes. The Code defines a creditor as an "entity that has

36. Jackson, supra note 32, at 728. Jackson refers to the available assets
as a "pie" and states that "[b]ankruptcy is designed to assure that the asset 'pie'
is as large as possible." Id
37. Id at 759. Creditors would seek to satisfy their individual rights by
obtaining payment before the bankruptcy proceeding freezes all the debtors
assets. Preference laws deter such potential asset grabbing by allowing the
trustee to "reach back" and undo the actions of individual creditors. Id
38. Id at 757.
39. Id at 760.
40. Nutovic, supra note 34, at 175 n.61.
41. Id.
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). See supra note 17 for text of statute.
43. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988). See supra note 18 for text of statute.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order
for relief concerning the debtor."4
Therefore, to be considered a
creditor, the inside guarantor must have a claim against the debtor.
The code defines a claim as a "right to payment, whether or not such
right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured. 46 Thus, to be considered a creditor, the inside guarantor
must have a right to payment from the debtor and the right can be
contingent.
Courts and commentators have generally concluded that the inside
guarantor is a creditor because the guarantor has a contingent right to
payment.47 One commentator maintains that it is settled law that "a
guarantor is a creditor holding a contingent claim that exists from the
date of the execution of the guarantee."48 In the event of default by
the debtor, if the lender collects from the guarantor, the guarantor
becomes subrogated to the lender's entitlements and can collect from the
corporation. Therefore, the inside guarantor of a corporate debt is a
creditor* in bankruptcy proceedings because the guarantor has a
contingent right to payment from the debtor if the guarantor must make
payment to the outside creditor.49 Judge Easterbrook took this
position concerning the inside guarantor in Levit.'
The preferential transfer involving an inside guarantor is known as
an "indirect" preference. 5' In an indirect preference, a preferential
payment to an outside creditor also indirectly prefers the creditor's
inside guarantor. The indirect preference is based on section 547(b)(1)
which provides that a preference may be based on a transfer "for the
benefit of a creditor."5 The inside guarantor is liable on the debt to
the outside creditor in the event of a default by the debtor. Therefore,

45. Id&§ 101(9)(A).
46. Id § 101(4)(A).
47. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 547.04 (15th ed. 1989) (A guarantor or
surety for the debtor, or an endorser of notes or checks, will be a creditor under
the Code because the guarantor holds a contingent claim against the debtor that
becomes fixed when the guarantor pays the creditor whose claim was guaranteed or insured. Consequently, assuming that all other elements of a preference
exist, transfers to a guarantor, surety, or indorser are avoidable as transfers "to"
the "creditor" guarantor, surety, or indorser.).
48. Nutovic, supra note 34, at 187.
49. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1190.
50. Id. at 1190 (a guarantor has a contingent right to payment from the
debtor: if Lender collects from Guarantor, Guarantor succeeds to Lender's
entitlements and can collect from Finn).
51. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: CASES AND
MATERIAL 485 (1982).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/22
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the inside guarantor benefits from any payment by the debtor to an
outside creditor because every reduction in the debt to the outside
creditor reduces the guarantor's exposure.53 Because the guarantor is
a creditor with an antecedent claim who is a beneficiary of the debtor's
payment to the outside creditor, the transfer to the outside creditor is
also a preference to the inside guarantor.'
Thus, under section 547, the lender (Ingersoll) was an outside
creditor and the guarantor (Deprizio) was an inside creditor. In other
words, the preferential payment that was avoidable under section 547
was a preference to both an inside creditor and an outside creditor.
The second aspect of the avoidance provisions of section 547 that is
important to this discussion is the "reachback" provisions.55 Basically,
even though a transfer is a preferential transfer, the trustee may not
attack it unless it was made within one of the time periods established
in section 547(b)(4). The Code establishes two different preferencerecovery timeframes, depending on whether the transfer was to an
outsider or an insider.5
The cases and commentators universally
agree that the preference-recovery period for an inside creditor is one
year 5" and for an outside creditor is ninety days.' The Code defines
"insider" in section 101(30). 59 Since a guarantor is almost always an
insider of the debtor, the inside guarantor is also an inside creditor for
preference-recovery purposes.
Direct transfers to inside creditors have universally been treated as
subject to the one year preference-recovery period. The difficult
situation arises with the indirect preference. Since the inside guarantor
is also an inside creditor, which preference-recovery period should
govern transfers to an outside creditor that also benefit an inside
guarantor? This is the issue confronted in the Levit case. Since the
preference is to an outside creditor and for the benefit of an inside

53. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1190.
54. Nutovic, supra note 34, at 187.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1988). For a discussion of the reachback
provision, see 4 COILIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 47, 547.07.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1988).
57. Id § 547(b)(4)(B).
58. Id.
59. d § 101(30). Section 101(30) provides:
(B) if the debtor is a corporation(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in
control of the debtor;
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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guarantor, should the ninety day outsider or the one year insider
preference-recovery period govern? In other words, does the benefit to
the inside guarantor subject the outside creditor to the one year
preference-recovery period of section 547(b)(4)(B)? Courts have looked
to section 550 of the Code to resolve this issue.
Section 550 of the Code governs the recoverablility of a preferential
transfer.6 A trustee may recover a preferential payment from either
the "initial transferee" or "the entity for whose benefit such transfer was
made."6 Thus, the trustee may recover a preference from either the
outside creditor (initial transferee) or the inside guarantor (entity for
whose benefit such transfer was made) or both. However, under section
547, the preference recovery period is longer for the inside creditor than
for the outside creditor. Therefore, the problem becomes one of whether
to extend the preference-recovery period for outside creditors from
ninety days to one year when there is an inside guarantor. Since the
trustee can recover from either the inside guarantor or the outside
creditor, which preference-recovery period should control the transfer?
Should the preference-recovery period be extended for an outside
creditor when a preferential payment benefits both an inside guarantor
the issue. The
and an outside creditor? Section 550 does not resolve
62
no.
say
majority
the
while
yes,
say
courts
of
minority
C. JudicialApproaches
The federal district and bankruptcy courts have historically used
three different approaches to establish the recovery period when a
preferential payment benefits both an inside guarantor and an outside
creditor: (1) equitable, (2) literal, and (3) two-transfer.

60. For a general discussion of section 550, see 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supranote 47, 550.01-.04.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988). 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supranote 47,
1550.02 n.8, indicates that the use of "or" allows the trustee to recover from any
combination of the transferees mentioned in the Code section.
62. For a recent summary and discussion of the minority and majority
positions, see Brands, Note: The Interplay Between Sections 547(b) and 550 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 89 COLUM. L. REV.530 (1989).
Brands argues that the outside creditor should not be exposed to the one
year preference-recovery period merely because there is an inside guarantor. Id.
at 531. He maintains that the outside creditor is protected by section 550(b)(1)
because the activities of the outside creditor are not the basis for the preference.
Id. at 547. Thus, the outside creditor is an initial transferee liable under section
550(a)(2), but is protected by section 550(b)(1). Id. at 547-48. This is a new
approach that has never been taken in a judicial proceeding.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/22
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The majority of the courts have held that inside guarantees do not
expose outside creditors to the one year preference-recovery period.m
These courts generally do not deny that the transfer to the outside
creditor also benefits an inside guarantor/creditor. However, they argue
that extending the preference-recovery period for the outside creditor to
one year because of the benefit to the inside guarantor would be
inequitable. 64 "It has long been recognized that a preference action is
a creature of equity and that the bankruptcy courts, in employing the
doctrine, are to apply equitable principles.' i
In In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.,' the court stated that "[i]n some
circumstances, a literal application of section 550(a) would permit the
trustee to recover from a party who is innocent of wrongdoing and
deserves protection. In such circumstances the bankruptcy court should
use its equitable powers to prevent an inequitable result." 7 The court
concluded that even if the transfer qualified as a one year preferencerecovery under section 547(b)(4)(B) because of the inside guarantor, "it
would be inequitable to allow recovery to the Debtor under Section 550
where the initial transferee is not an insider and where payments to it
were not made within ninety (90) days of filing. 08 Thus, the equity
argument contends that it surely could not be the drafters' intent to give
a better creditor position to a lender who does not demand a personal
69
guarantee than to one who does.
A minority of courts have held that the outsider creditor is subject
to the one year preference-recovery period because of the literal meaning
of sections 547 and 550.70 This "literal interpretation" approach

63. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1189 n.2; In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc., 96 Bankr. 77
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (alternative holding); In re Midwestern Cos., Inc., 96
Bankr. 224 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); In re C-L Cartage Co., 70 Bankr. 928
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987); In re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1985); In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc., 34 Bankr. 888 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983);
In re Cove Patio Corp., 19 Bankr. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Duccilli
Formal Wear, Inc., 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1180 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re
Church Buildings & Interiors, Inc., 14 Bankr. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981).
64. See, e.g., 4 COLLIER ON BANKRuproy, supra note 47,

550.02.

65. In re Midwestern Cos., 96 Bankr. at 225.
66. 96 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
67. Id. at 80. The court cited 4 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY, supra note 47, 1
550.02, for authority. Id.
68. Id. at 81 (citations omitted).
69. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 47, 91547.02.
70. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1189 n.2; In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc., 97
Bankr. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988); In re Coastal Petroleum Corp., 91 Bankr.
35 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co., 86 Bankr. 545
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); In re W.E. Tucker Oil, Inc., 42 Bankr. 897 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1984); In re Big Three Transp., Inc., 41 Bankr. 16 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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maintains that a literal reading of the Code requires extending the
preference-recovery period for an outside creditor to one year when an
inside guarantor is present.7 ' They reason that section 547 allows the
trustee to recover from the inside guarantor if a preferential transfer
was made within the one year period before the bankruptcy petition.
Thus, the preference-recovery period for the transfer is one year. Then,
section 550(a) allows the trustee to collect from either the initial
transferee (the outside creditor) or the one for whose benefit the transfer
was made (the inside guarantor).72 Since the inside guarantor is an
inside creditor, the preference period for recovery under section 550 is
one year and recovery can be made from either the inside guarantor or
the outside creditor. 73 This is the position taken by Judge Easterbrook
which will be discussed later.7 4
Two courts have used a third approach. 5 These courts reasoned
that, when an inside guarantor is present, a transfer by the debtor is
actually two transfers-one to the outside creditor in satisfaction of the
primary indebtedness and one to the inside guarantor in satisfaction of
the contingent liability.7 6 The outsider is subject to the 90 day
preference-recovery period of section 547(b)(4)(A) while the insider is
subject to the one year period of section 547(b)(4)(B). Under this
rationale, the trustee can recover from the outside creditor and the
inside guarantor if the transfer occurred within ninety days prior to the
petition for bankruptcy; but only from the inside guarantor if the
transfer occurred within one year but before ninety days prior to the
petition. After discussing the other two approaches to the problem, the
bankruptcy court in Deprizio adopted the two-transfer theory and held
the trustee could not recover from Ingersoll Rand.77
IV. THE LEVIT DECISION
In Levit, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals began with a
discussion of the purpose for a bankruptcy trustee's power to avoid
preferences. 8 The goal in bankruptcy proceedings is to distribute the

71. For a thorough discussion of the literal approach, see In re Midwestern
Cos., Inc., 96 Bankr. 224, 224-25 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
72. In re Installation Servs., Inc., 101 Bankr. 282, 286 (Bankr. N.D.
Alabama 1989).
73. Id.
74. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
75. In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co., 58 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986);
In re Mercon Indus., Inc., 37 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
76. In re Mercon Indus., Inc., 37 Bankr. at 552.
77. In re Deprizio, 58 Bankr. at 480-81.
78. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1194.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/22

12

Rodenberg: Rodenberg: Indirect Preferences
1990]

INDIRECT PREFERENCES

339

available assets equitably.79 All creditors have a strong incentive to
acquire assets of a troubled firm before bankruptcy proceedings
begin.'
By doing so, they may avoid the possibility of receiving less
than full value on their debt. 8 ' The preference sections of the Code
seek to prevent this "asset grabbing" and keep the common asset pool
intact.12 Thus, the trustee's avoiding powers serve to discourage asset
grabbing in two ways: *
[First, they eliminate the benefit of attaching assets out of the
ordinary course in the last 90 days before the filing, so that the rush
to dismember a firm is not profitable from a creditor's perspective;
second, they assure each creditor that if it refrains from acting, the
grabbing by any other creditor will be returned to the common pool.'
The court then addressed the preference-recovery period issue.
Insiders present a special problem for the Code.' Insiders will be the
first to know that a firm is financially in trouble. Thus, "if insiders and
outsiders have the same preference-recovery period, insiders who lent
money to the firm could use their knowledge to advantage by paying
their own loans preferentially, then putting off filing the petition in
bankruptcy until the preference period had passed. ' 85 Therefore, the
Code established a longer preference-recovery period for direct transfers
to insiders than for direct transfers to outsiders. 6e
The court recognized, however, that Deprizio did not personally
lend money to the debtor. Rather, he personally guaranteed a loan from
an outside lender. As a guarantor, Deprizio was personally liable for
the debt if the debtor defaulted. Thus, the transfer in Levit was not

79. Id
80. Id.
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id.; see also Jackson, supra note 32, at 759. By reaching back to undo
the actions of individual creditors, preference law deters such potential grabbing,
thereby protecting the creditors' bargain.
However, it seems unlikely that the
preference law will serve to discourage the so-called "asset grabbing." In reality,
creditors are still most likely to zealously protect their interests in a potentially
insolvent situation. The penalty for a preferential transfer is that the creditor
has to return the asset. The alternative is the risk that the transfer will not be
considered preferential or the filing of the petition will be later than one year
from the transfer. Under that situation, the creditor would lose the asset to the
more aggressive creditor. Thus, it actually seems unlikely that the preference
provisions will discourage asset grabbing.
84. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1195.
85. Id
86. Id; see also 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1988).
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directly to an insider. The transfer was to an outside creditor and for
the benefit of an inside guarantor.
The court reasoned that inside guarantors could serve their own
interests by inducing the debtor to pay the guaranteed creditors
preferentially.87 If they could do so prior to ninety days before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, under the majority equitable approach,88 they could be benefitted to the detriment of other creditors.
Therefore, the court maintained that a one year recovery period for
89
inside guarantors should help prevent last-minute asset grabbing.
The court focused its arguments on the need to deter inside guarantors
from benefiting themselves by making preferential transfers to outside
creditors and then postponing the bankruptcy petition to take advantage
of the ninety day preference-recovery period for outside creditors.
The court then examined the three approaches historically used to
establish the preference-recovery period when a transfer benefits both
an inside guarantor and an outside creditor. The court first looked at
the two-transfer theory. Judge Easterbrook reasoned that the twotransfer theory is not supported by the structure of the Code or the
90
The theory equates "transfer" with
legislative history behind it.
91
"benefit received." The Code, however, defines a transfer as "[e]very
mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in
property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption."9 2 Thus, a transfer is a
"disposition" of property from the debtor's standpoint, not a benefit
received from the creditor's perspective.93 "A single payment, there94
fore, is one 'transfer', no matter how many persons gain thereby.
The court concluded that the language of the Code cannot support a
two-transfer interpretation.
The court next looked for legislative history to support the twotransfer theory. Judge Easterbrook argued that legislative history did

87. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1195.
88. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
89. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1195.
90. Id. at 1195-97.
91. IcL at 1195. The premise is that since both the inside guarantor and the
outside creditor receive a benefit, two transfers effectively occur-one to the
guarantor and one to the outside creditor. Thus, since there are two benefits,
the theory holds that there must be two transfers. One payment is treated as
though it is in reality two.
92. 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1988).
93. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1195.
94. Id. at 1196.
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not discuss the situation. 5 Ingersoll Rand Financial Corporation had
argued that this silence meant Congress intended to preserve the
practice under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 of recovering payments only
from those to whom the transfer represented a preference. 8 The court
reasoned that "[i]t is not the law that a statute can have no effects
which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history."97 The
court explained that wholesale changes in the preference-recovery
structure of the Code meant that the pre-Code practices were not useful
to interpret the current Code provisions.98
Therefore, the court
concluded that the two-transfer approach lacked statutory support.'
The court next looked at the equity approach. Even though
Ingersoll Rand Financial Corporation did not make an equity argument
for a ninety day recovery period, Judge Easterbrook addressed it
because it is the majority approach.'"
He reasoned that even if
equity arguments were admissible,' 0 ' they would not help. °2 First,
he argued that the free market adjusts regardless of the length of the
preference-recovery period. In other words, faced with the possibility of
the longer preference-recovery period because of the inside guarantor,
creditors will charge slightly higher rates of interest and monitor
debtors more closely. The creditors will receive the competitive rate of
return in financial markets-the same risk-adjusted rate they would
have received with a 90-day preference-recovery period. 03 "A rule
may injure debtors and creditors by foreclosing efficient business
arrangements and increasing the rate of interest low-risk borrowers

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id (quoting Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414, 420-21
(1988)).
98. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1197. The court points out that the Code separates
the identification of avoidable transfers (§ 547) from the identification of those
who must pay (§ 550). Id This structural change has no antecedents in the
1898 Act. It also creates for the first time the principle that transfers may be
recoverable from either transferee or beneficiary. Id. at 1196.
99. Id.
100. Id at 1198.
101. Judge Easterbrooknotes his previous rebuff to "equity arguments." Id,
at 1197. Equity arguments must operate within the confines of the Code and
cannot be used to rewrite rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically
enacted. Id. Because the Code specifically addresses the issue in the instant
case, equity arguments are not appropriate.
102. Id. at 1198.
103. Id (creditors will receive the competitive rate of return in financial
markets-the same risk-adjusted rate they would have received with a ninetyday preference-recovery period).
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Thus, the extended
must pay, . . . but inefficiency is not inequity."'
preference-recovery period is not inequitable because outside creditors
can protect themselves from any possible adverse effects.
Judge Easterbrook argued in the alternative that it would be
inequitable to refuse to extend the preference-recovery period when an
inside guarantor is involved.' 0 5 Without the extended preferencerecovery period, an inside guarantor can manipulate the Code to make
Judge
preferential payments in the face of pending insolvency.'
Easterbrook concluded that it cannot be inequitable to require the
the inside guarantors, when they bargained
outside creditors to pursue
10 7
for exactly that recourse.
The court concluded that the plain language of the Code required
an extended preference-recovery period for outside creditors when an
inside guarantor was present. The court adopted the reasoning of the
district court.4 8 The court argued that section 547 establishes the
transfer to the outside creditor as an avoidable preference that benefits
an inside guarantor.3 9 Since the transfer benefits the inside guarantor, the preference-recovery period for the transfer is one year. Then,
section 550 authorizes the trustee to recover the preference from either
the outside creditor or the inside guarantor."0 In summary, the court
held that "the preference-recovery period for outside creditors is one
year when the payment produces a benefit for an inside creditor,
including a guarantor.""'

V. ANALYSIS
A. Literal InterpretationApproach
Judge Easterbrook decided the Levit case based on the literal
interpretation approach used by a minority of courts. However, a literal
reading of the Code may not require the trustee to use the same

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The court also addressed the policy argument that an extended
preference-recovery period would force creditors to precipitate bankruptcy filings
at the slightest sign of financial trouble. The court concluded that "it is not
clear to us that bankruptcy proceedings are more costly than workouts." Id.
108. In re Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 552-53.
109. Id. The inside guarantor is a creditor because there is a contingent
right to collect from the debtor if the guarantor is required to pay on the debt.
See supra notes 41-62. and accompanying text.
110. In re Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 552-53.
111. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1201.
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preference-recovery period for the inside guarantor and outside creditor.
In In re Midwestern Companies, Inc.," 2 decided at almost the
same time as Levit, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri held that the preference-recovery period for all
outside creditors is ninety days, even when an inside guarantor is
present. The court argued that "[section] 550(a)(1) was not intended to
expand the Trustee's right to recover preferences as provided in [section]
547. ,113 The court noted that section 547 provides for two different
and distinct preference-recovery periods depending on whether the
creditor is an insider or an outsider.11 4 This distinction would
disappear if courts read section 550 to extend the outsider preferencerecovery period when an inside guarantor is involved.'1 6 The court
maintained that the time limit distinctions established in section 547
should be applied to section 550. Therefore, the court held that when
an inside guarantor is present, the trustee may recover from the
guarantor any preferential payments made within one year of the
bankruptcy petition or may recover from the outside creditor or insider6
guarantor any preferential payments made within ninety days."
Thus, it is possible that a literal reading of sections 547 and 550 could
restrict a trustee to a ninety day preference-recovery period for all
outside creditors, even when there is an inside guarantor.
B.

Equity Approach

The plight of the outside creditor with an inside guarantor may not7
warrant the use of equitable principles. Easterbrook and others"
maintain that the outside creditor who gets an inside guarantee is not
a helpless victim of the system who needs equitable relief."8 The

112. 102 Bankr. 169, 169 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
113. I& at 173 (quoting In re Cove Patio Corp., 19 Bankr. 843, 845 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1982)).
114. I& .
115. Id. The court concluded that "there would be no need to distinguish
between insiders and non-insiders for purposes of determining avoidability if
recovery from insiders and non-insiders alike would occur anyway." Id.
116. Id
117. See, e.g., Nutovic, supranote 34, at 195-97; Pitts, supranote 31, at 35356.
118. Brands, supranote 62, at 539. "This conclusion is based on the theory
that the lender, by accepting an insider guarantee, has created an 'identity of
interest' with the insider.... The identity of interest theory holds that because
the lender demanded the guaranty in order to profit from the insider's
preferential behavior, recovery from the lender is not inequitable." Id.
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outside creditor in this situation is not the typical arms-length
creditor." 9 In reality, the outside creditor obtains the inside guarantee for the purpose of gaining preferential treatment should the debtor's
financial position require discriminating payments.120 Thus, "[b]y
taking the guarantee of insiders, the creditor generally creates pressure
on those presumed to be in control of the debtor to afford it preferred
treatment.'0 21 One commentator concluded that "their indirect control
of the debtor corporation certainly detracts from the notion that their
plight merits special consideration so that the written words of Congress
should not, in equity, be applied to them."122 Thus, if the outside
creditor uses the inside guarantor mainly to manipulate potential
insolvency, where is the need for equitable protection?
Congressional intent seems to be contrary to any attempt to alter
the results of the preference provisions of the Code with the equitable
approach. The preference provisions are a mechanical test to be applied
without any reference to the knowledge or culpable intent of any party
to the transaction."2 Thus, one commentator concluded that "Congress presumably defined preferences in such a way because it felt that
trustees should not be hampered by the difficult task of proving
subjective questions of knowledge and intent, and that the importance
of this policy outweighed occasional inequities to creditors."'"
Another commentator concluded that it is not the "courts' function to
expound bankruptcy policy in a manner wholly divorced from the
congressional scheme."1" Thus, the inside guarantor situation does
not present
a strong enough case for proper use of equitable pow1 26
ers.
C. Exclusion Protection
In reality other Code provisions mitigate the potential burden to
outside creditors from an extended preference-recovery period. The

119. Pitts, supranote 31, at 354. By procuring an insider's guaranty, Bank
has fostered an identity of interest between Guarantor and Debtor's other
creditors. Id The outside creditor obtained the inside guarantee because "as
a matter of economic and psychological reality, the personal guaranty of an
insider may be better security for repayment before bankruptcy than legal
interests in a debtor's property." Id.
120. Id.
121. Nutovic, supranote 34, at 195-96.
122. Id at 196.
123. Id.
124. Id- at 197.
125. Pitts, supra note 31, at 361.
126. Nutovic, supranote 34, at 199.
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Code contains provisions to protect most good-faith arms-length
transactions from the effects of the preference law. These provisions
exclude specific types of transfers from the trustee's avoidance powers.
Judge Easterbrook argued that these protections
"exclude from recovery
1 27
the bulk of ordinary commercial payments.'
First of all, section 547(b)(3) requires that the transfer be made
while the debtor is insolvent.'28 Therefore, if the transfer did not
occur when the debtor was insolvent, the trustee may not avoid it. In
addition, section 547(b)(5) requires that the payment be more than the
creditor would receive in bankruptcy.12
Thus, the preferential
transfer must exceed the amount the creditor would have received if the
payment had come through a bankruptcy proceeding.
Section 547(c)' 30 limits the trustee as to payments that may be

127. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1199.
128. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (1988).
129. Id. § 547(b)(5).
130. Id. § 547(c). Section 547(c) provides in part:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer(1) to the extent that such transfer was(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose
benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous
exchange for new value given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent that such transfer was(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the
ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and
the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the
debtor(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value
[in the nature of a purchase-money security interest]
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such
transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the
debtor(A) not secured by an otherwise avoidable security interest;,
and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make
an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such
creditor;
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a
receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the
aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a reduc-
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avoided. For instance, the trustee may not avoid payments made in the
normal course of conducting business between the parties.1 31 This
"ordinary course" exclusion covers all transactions between the parties
that are typical periodic financing arrangements.' 32 Furthermore,
section 547(c) excludes fully secured creditors from the reach of the
preference law.133 Thus, fully secured creditors are not subject3 4to the
preference-recovery period even if they have inside guarantors.
These section 547 exclusions are consistent with the intent of the
Code to avoid only preferential payments. Thus:
The creditor is only worse off in one particular instance-when (i)
receiving a payment between ninety days and one year prior to the
filing of the debtor's petition, which is a preference to the insiderguarantor, and (ii) when the insider-guarantor is unable to respond to
a judgment for the amount sought in the preference action.5
Because of these limits on the trustee's avoidance powers, extending
the preference-recovery period to one year for outside creditors when
there is an insider guarantor would probably not change lender

tion ... to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims,
of any amount by which the debt*secured by such security interest
exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on [one of
three defined dates]
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable
under section 545 of this title; or
(7) [aggregate transfers of less than $600 for an individual
debtor].
Id. "This is the current version of § 547(c), as amended in 1984 to eliminate the
former requirement in § 547(c)(2) that the payment come within 45 days of the
debt to count as one in due course." Levit, 874 F.2d at 1199.
131. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988). For instance, ordinary financing
arrangements are covered by this "ordinary course" exclusion. Levit, 874 F.2d
at 1200. Also, when a creditor makes an unsecured loan guaranteed by an
insider and requiring monthly payments over a number of years, this is covered
by the ordinary course exclusion to the extent the debtor paid on time. Id.
132. Nutovic, supranote 34, at 196. "Because regular payments generally
will be protected by the 'ordinary course' exception discussed in the first part of
this article, it is only the unusual payments that will be subject to avoidance."
Id.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (1988).
134. Judge Easterbrook explained that if a creditor is fully secured, then the
"payment does not produce a benefit for the inside guarantor, whose exposure
was zero." Levit, 874 F.2d at 1199.
135. Nutovic, supra note 34, at 197.
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"Creditors will continue to take
practices to any great degree."
insider guarantees where the guarantor has meaningful assets."'137 If
the creditor is fully secured, the payments will be unaffected by the
Code. Otherwise, the creditor could sue the guarantor on the assets just
as if there were no insolvency problems. Thus, one commentator
concluded that even if the preference-recovery period is extended to one
year when an inside guarantor is present:
[Cireditors will forego obtaining an insider's guarantee only when the
guarantor's assets are insufficient to back up the guaranteed debt and
the reason for requesting the guarantee is merely to exert pressure on
the insider. Discouraging guarantees taken for their control valve is
"the essential purpose of the
desirable because it would promote
1
insider preference provision."1

D. Waiver of Indemnification
The inside guarantor can remove the possibility of the one year
preference-recovery period by refusing to be a "creditor." As discussed
above, the guarantor is a creditor because of a contingent right to
payment from the debtor. This contingent right qualifies the guarantor
as a creditor and subjects the guarantor to the preference laws. Thus,
if the guarantor waives all rights of indemnification from the debtor, the
guarantor is no longer a contingent creditor and is therefore not subject
to the trustee's avoidance powers. 1" The outside creditor can control
the situation by requiring the guarantor to expressly waive any right to
Thus, this simple drafting
indemnification from the debtor. 40

136. "[I]t is unlikely that this will discourage lenders from extending credit."
Id.
137. Id
138. Id.
139. One commentator stated:
Other protection that § 547 affords to the "creditor" are that she may
know herself to be safe from preference attacks if she is not an insider
and the transfer took place outside of the 90-day reach-back period,
if she can claim the protection of one of the exceptions of § 547(c), or
if she no longer is a "creditor" of the debtor. The last protection may
be manipulated in the insider-guarantor situation: the insider can
expressly waive all the rights she has as a guarantor of indemnification from the debtor. Through the simple expedient, the insider no
longer qualifies as a "creditor" under §§ 547(b)(1) and 101(a).
Brands, supra note 62, at 544.
140. Nutovic, supra note 34, at 197. Nutovic stated:
Attorneys familiar with the preference laws are insisting on provisions
in a guarantee that extend the guarantor's liability to any payments
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technique allows the parties some protection from any harshness of an
extended preference-recovery period.
VI. CONCLUSION
The inside guarantor presents a difficult situation for the bankruptcy preference laws. 4 1 It is fairly apparent that inside guarantors
can manipulate an insolvency situation by making preferential
payments to outside creditors to reduce their exposure in the face of
bankruptcy.'4 2 The one year preference-recovery period for them is
very appropriate. The real problem is the innocence of the outside
creditor. How much control does the outsider have over the actions of
the guarantor? Why should an outside creditor be adversely affected
because of the manipulative activities of an inside guarantor?1 43 In

made by the primary obligor subsequently recovered by a trustee.
Thus, if recovery is initially sought from the transferee, the transferee
should have little difficulty in recovering from the guarantor.
141. Perhaps the best indication of the divided positions on this issue
appears in two recent cases. On May 26, 1989, in In re Installation Services,
Inc., 101 Bankr. 282 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989), the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division, adopted the
literal interpretation and allowed recovery from an outside creditor of a payment
made between ninety days and one year from the bankruptcy petition because
the creditor had an inside guarantor. However, on April 18, 1989, in In re
Midwestern Companies, Inc., 102 Bankr. 169, 173 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989), the
United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, held that a
literal interpretation of the preference laws required a one-year preferencerecovery period for outsider creditors, regardless of whether the creditor had an
inside guarantor.
142. One commentator stated:
[Insiders] typically have a significant amount of control over the
operations of the debtor.... When the debtor's demise is imminent,
the insiders who guaranteed the debtor's loan frequently hold enough
sway with the debtor to cause it to pay off these guaranteed loans
prior to the payment of other obligations. Consequently, the insiders
have-diverted the debtor [sic] resources to protect themselves.
Nutovic, supra note 34, at 195.
143. The minority of courts that have dealt with the issue have interpreted
the Code's preference provisions as requiring that an outside creditor be subject
to a one-year preference-recovery period if the creditor has an inside guarantee
on the debt. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1185; see also In re Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 552.
This seems consistent with the Code's intent to discourage preferential payments
by insiders in anticipation of bankruptcy. Jackson, supranote 32, at 759; see
also Nutovic, supra note 34, at 186. However, even though it serves to
discourage the preferential actions of the inside guarantor, it is arguable that
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/22
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Levit, the court held that the outside creditor very much controls the
preferential payment and as such should be subjected to the insider one
year preference-recovery period.
The courts seem to be struggling with policy issues because the
Code is ambiguous concerning initial transferees in indirect preferences.
However, policy arguments aside, the approach most true to the Code
should maintain the preference-recovery distinction between inside and
outside creditors that is found in section 547 of the Code. 144 It does
not seem to be a requirement of a literal interpretation of the Code to
extend the preference-recovery period for outside creditors when there
is an inside guarantor. Section 550(a) does not require the same
preference-recovery period for inside guarantors and outside creditors.
If a transfer is determined to be preferential under section 547, the
trustee could recover from either the inside guarantor or the outside
creditor if it was made within ninety days before the bankruptcy
petition and from the inside guarantor alone if it was made between one
year and ninety days before the petition.
This approach would negate the necessity of using equitable
arguments to prevent a guaranteed debt from being in a worse
bankruptcy position than a non-guaranteed debt. There is no need to
extend the preference-recovery period to discourage asset grabbing
because it is not likely that the preference reachback periods have any
effect on an unsecured creditor's desire to protect its position in light of
a financially troubled debtor. The trustee could sue the inside guarantor on the preference transfer just as could the outside creditor. Thus,
the inside guarantor has the same risk with regard to preferential
transfers.
In the case of indirect preferences, the Code is not clear as to the
length of the recovery period for the outside creditor. Thus, various
interpretations have developed from equally competent and reasoned
the extended preference-recovery period is unfair to the arms-length outside
creditor. Therefore, based on equitable principles, the majority has refused to
extend the ninety day preference-recovery period for outside creditors. Levit,
874 F.2d at 1189; see also In re Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 552.
144. Section 547(b) expressly creates two different preference-recovery
periods. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). This is even more significant because
the distinction did not exist in the pre-Code bankruptcy laws. However, Judge
Easterbrook's well-reasoned opinion in Levit is a strong argument for extending
the preference-recovery period. The main issue seems to be the possible
deterrent effect of extending the preference-recovery period. If the inside
guarantor indeed has an advantage, then a stronger case exists for extending
the preference-recovery period when an inside guarantor is involved. However,
if the preference-recovery law does not really affect the decisions of the inside
guarantor, it would seem best to preserve the ninety day preference-recovery
period for all outside creditors.
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groups. Currently, policy arguments dominate the attempts to establish
a recovery period for the indirect preferences. Either Congress or the
United States Supreme Court must resolve this issue. Until then,
lenders should continue to use established lending practices. "As with
most other instances of enhanced exposure for lenders under the Code,
the optimum advice may be to be aware of the risk, to compensate for
it in other ways, but not to change basic business practices if those
practices continue to make sense."14' 5 Lenders should be aware that
payments which qualify as preferences may potentially be avoided if
there is an inside guarantor and the payment is received within one
'year before a petition in bankruptcy. Therefore, it may be the best
approach for guarantors to draft the guarantor agreement such that the
guarantor waives any rights to indemnity from the debtor. This would
remove the inside guarantor from creditor status and prevent any
possibility of extending the preference-recovery period to one year.
JAMEs A. RODENBERG

145. Pitts, supra note 31, at 361.
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